Dozens of journalists have descended on Geneva for what’s expected to be the most futile diplomatic encounter of the year.
The Iranian nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, is to meet what some call the P5+1 and others the E3+3. That means the permanent five of the UN Security Council plus Germany, or – if you’d rather – three European countries (France, UK, Germany) + China, Russia and the USA.
The idea is that Iran tells them all about its nuclear programme, and in response the Islamic Republic is invited back into the fold, sanctions are withdrawn and everyone goes home happy. The western officials who I’ve been talking to don’t seem to think this scenario is very likely.
“The Iranians like to argue that the ball is never in their court,” mused one. “In fact, they argue that there is no ball and there is no court.”
A veteran of such meetings, he predicted that Mr Jalili would start the plenary session with a two and half hour diatribe on martyrdom in the Iran/Iraq War. “Then we’ll have lunch and if he goes on for another two and half hours afterwards, then I don’t think it will be a success.”
The Iranian government has put forward a series of items for discussion, none of which involve its nuclear programme which it says is not up for debate. President Ahmadinejad said today he sees this as an opportunity for the USA and European countries to change their attitude.
Diplomats always try to play down expectations the day before a meeting, so any small movement can be deemed a success, but maybe this time the pessimism is for real.
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Whose court is the ball in?
It depends on what you think is realistic and sensible.
To prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, the most realistic and sensible option seems to be that put forward by former US diplomat Thomas Pickering and former British diplomat Sir John Thomson: uranium enrichment on Iranian soil (Tehran gets what it wants) in a facility co-owned and co-managed by an international consortium, with an integrated international staff able to monitor all facets of the operation, and prevent undetected and unauthorised enrichment to weapons-grade uranium (the West gets what it wants).
This super-charged version of IAEA inspection/monitoring has long been on the table. If there is to be progress, the P5+1 must be willing to grasp the opportunity.
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